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MODERN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE 
EROSION OF THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE IN 
DELAWARE CORPORATE LAW 
 
William T. Allen* 
 
I.  
 
This essay represents a slightly modified version of the January 2008 
Davies Fund for Business Law Lecture that I delivered at Osgoode Hall 
Law School in Toronto. It addresses the relationship between the forces 
shaping modern corporate governance and wisdom of a liability rule to 
enforce the fiduciary duty of care against corporate directors. 
 This subject, and the topic of corporate governance more generally, are 
topics of public importance.  The modern business corporation is the 
instrumentality within which the greatest part of our economic activity 
occurs, in which jobs and wealth are created and through which, to a great 
extent, our national competitiveness is maintained. It is largely within the 
corporate form that all of the great scientific discoveries from the time of 
the second industrial revolution forward have been shaped into useful 
products or services and brought to markets to improve human lives.  
From railroads to automobiles and airplanes, from aspirin to  immuno-
suppressants, from electricity, telephony, and computers, to the internet, 
WiFi and  almost everything else that makes our lives  safer, healthier, 
easier and more pleasant—all are produced and distributed by people 
organized within the publicly financed corporate form.  The legal rules 
and practices and the economic techniques we deploy to incent and control 
the various individuals playing roles within these institutions matters to 
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their efficiency and thus matters to our wealth production.  And while the 
production of wealth is not our ultimate value, still the production of 
wealth is very important to us.  With greater wealth we can dedicate more 
resources to study, to research and to the improvement of the human 
condition.  Certainly a great deal else matters vitally to our public welfare, 
but the productivity and innovation that occurs within the business 
corporations is essential for our welfare. What business lawyers do – and I 
hope those who study corporation law also do -- is therefore imbued with 
the public interest. 
My perspective on the subject of corporation law and governance may not 
be entirely conventional.  For twelve years I sat on the Court of Chancery 
of Delaware in the United States.  The judges of that court spend most of 
their time adjudicating cases of alleged breaches of fiduciary duty by 
corporate officer or directors. For the beginning lawyer such cases may 
seem to require complex technical legal analysis. But my years thinking 
about these cases lead me to see the core or heart of this area of law as not 
really legally technical at all.  Rather I came to see that, beyond an 
understanding of technical black letter law, appreciation of three types of 
knowledge was essential to understand the law governing the obligations 
of corporate directors.    
 The first is an understanding of the economic function of the corporate 
form, of the respective economic roles of the corporate CEO and of 
corporate directors in effectively managing that form and the likely 
economic consequences to the operation of the form in future of particular 
judicial decisions.   
The second element of understanding of the role and requisites of the 
corporate director, in my opinion, is an understanding of the opened-ended 
nature of the directors’ legal obligation to the corporation and its 
shareholders. The essence of that obligation, while supervisory, is 
nevertheless to act as a faithful agent would act in the same or similar 
circumstances, --- we call this core obligation the fiduciary duty of loyalty.  
It of course is an obligation of great generality and it is so for the simple 
reason that the corporate form is, at its creation, intended to operate over 
an indefinite period  in which unforeseen changes perhaps radical changes 
will inevitably occur.  Thus the tasks appropriate to try to met the profit 
making goal of the corporation in these various unknown future states 
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cannot be specified.  In lieu of detailed instructions to directors, the law 
provides, and investors rely upon, the vague generalities of the fiduciary 
duty of loyalty.  In giving content to this general obligation in particular 
cases even judges with a sensitive understanding of the economics of the 
corporation’s business  may sometimes be required to resort  to ideas  of 
fairness in the relevant community.  Thus, sometimes, ill-defined notions 
of fairness play an important part in shaping directors duties and in 
understanding the requirements of corporate governance. 
The third source of understanding of the content of fiduciary obligations 
can be found in the judges appreciation of the history of the corporate 
institution.  Of course, a most powerful part of that history is captured in 
judicial precedents, which when applicable a judge will be bound to 
respect and apply.  But beyond that particular source of history, the best 
judges will also have a sound understanding of the evolution of the legal 
and business environment within which directors are required to function.  
Law is not the only force shaping director action and those enforcing the 
legal systems obligations on corporate directors should be mindful of the 
interactive quality of the various social forces that create that environment. 
My talk tonight will to a large extent be about these non-legal social forces 
that affect director behavior and thus should be taken into consideration, in 
my opinion, by judges shaping the fiduciary obligations of those directors. 
The title I have chosen for this talk is Modern Corporate Governance and 
the Erosion of the Business Judgment Rule.     
When I use the term corporate governance I mean the complex of legal 
rules and social practices that allocate and constraint power over the 
internal affairs of a business corporation.  The main function of these rules  
are two: first to provide for the efficient management of firms by 
professional managers and thus improve the ability of the firm to 
effectively engage in commercial activity and, second, to provide 
sufficient protections to providers of capital to induce them to commit 
their savings to the corporate enterprise without any legal right to a return.  
We legal academics in our writing virtually ignore the first of these 
purposes while focusing exclusively on the second.  
From a legal point of view it is  the corporate board of directors, elected 
by the equity investors, that serves as the lynchpin of corporate 
governance.  It designates the powerful central managers and is charged to 
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monitor their performance. It is upon the corporate directors that I focus 
this afternoon. 
 For the men and women who serve on a corporate board today, perhaps 
Charles Dickens best captured the present situation:  these are the best of 
times and the worst of times.  
 It is the best of times for board service in the sense that the corporate 
board is daily becoming a more significant player in our business culture.  
Thus, the opportunity to do useful and important work through 
membership on a corporate board has never been so great.  For those men 
and women who joined a corporate board in order to further extend and 
deploy their talents, and to use  their energy and experience in a positive 
way, this may indeed be the best of times. 
But this may also seem the worst of times for corporate directors. Never 
has it been less clear exactly what is required to meet one’s responsibilities 
in this role fully.  Never has board service seemed to expose a director to 
greater risk of public criticism or embarrassment, deservedly or 
undeservedly and, in the event that on one’s watch a great financial loss 
befalls the corporation, never have the risks of personal liability seemed 
greater. 
 
II. 
It was not ever thus.  For much of the last century corporate boards were 
typically composed of senior  managers of the firm, and outsiders related 
by business to the company – bankers, lawyers or suppliers. 
Independence, the value that modern commentators and regulators prize so 
highly was not very prominent. In this world, corporate directors acted 
chiefly as advisors to the corporation’s chief executive officer.  Certainly 
boards had a formal role in selecting and compensating the CEO, 
overseeing his succession plans, and reviewing his strategic planning, but 
in the ideology of board service of the time, boards were not seen as 
primarily responsible for these things.  From the time of the rise of large 
capital markets until rather recently, at least in the U.S., public company 
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boards have been largely passive, reactive instrumentalities. Many at the 
time thought this was inevitable  given the directors tiny ownership stakes  
and the part time involvement with the company.  
We might call this model of a limited board, the Advisory Board Model of 
the corporate board.  From the period when family control of large 
enterprise was replaced by professional managers until, lets say, 1985, the 
Advisory Board conception provided the normative model for how we 
thought boards did and should work. This was not seen as problematic. 
The  success of the modern economy made questions of corporate 
governance seem largely irrelevant. This was especially true for the 
decades following the conclusion of World War II.  The 1950s and 60s 
were halcyon days in economic terms at least.  That period was marked by 
high growth rates, moderate unemployment and stable prices. At the 
center of this economy were the large, powerful and seemingly permanent 
U.S. business corporations which dominated global markets.  
These large corporations – General Motors, AT&T, U.S. Steel, etc -- 
seemed such a permanent feature of the social landscape that in 1966 the 
Canadian-born economist John Kenneth Galbraith claimed in a popular 
book, The New Industrial State, that they represented a new and 
dangerous challenge to democratic government. He asserted that these 
business corporations  had succeeded  in freeing themselves from the 
constraints of competitive product markets largely through manipulative 
advertising; were free of capital markets constraints through their internal 
generation of capital; were largely free of unwanted government 
interference through revolving door employment practices and were free 
of Shareholder constraint because shareholders had been dispersed by 
capital markets and were passive and powerless too. Controlling these 
powerful institutions  Galbraith saw not a system of corporate governance 
but only self-perpetuating senior managers who selected and dominated 
the corporate boards that nominally supervised them.  Thus the leadership 
of these monster firms was seen as responsible to virtually no one.  
This 1966 vision of an emerging corporatist society was plausible to many 
at the time, but, in fact, events were to prove this vision badly incorrect. 
For even as The New Industrial State was being written deep social forces 
were at work that over the next 25 years would transform what Professor 
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Galbraith had seen as an impregnable permanent economic power 
structure.  
The first of these was emergence by the 1970s of powerful global 
competition in product markets.  Two facts drove this heightened product 
market competition.  The first is the primal driver of so much change in 
our times:  technological innovation.  Technology has the capacity while 
creating great new opportunities to rapidly if not instantly to render whole 
product lines irrelevant. Silicon chips, the computer, miniaturization and 
bio technology were perhaps the greatest drivers of this more competitive 
world.  The transformations that they occasioned changed existing 
business structures because they changed every part of our lives.  
The second factor creating more competitive product markets was the 
arrival on the scene circa 1975 of powerful new national economies. 
World War II had resulted in the destruction of the industrial infrastructure 
of the axis nations. We in North America, by contrast, came out of the war 
not only intact, but muscular with wartime growth.  Thus we possessed the 
most highly productive economies in the decades following 1945.  
American firms dominated international markets by default. 
But by the mid 1970s Japan and Germany had largely  rebuilt their 
industrial capacity with state of the art technology and were seeking global 
markets.  Thus the close of the 1970s foreign produced goods were 
challenging the dominance of American corporations not only in foreign 
markets, but in a variety of important U.S.  product markets —cars and 
electronics being early and notable examples. We were no longer king of 
the hill; henceforth we would have to fight for the even the ground we 
needed to stand on, and not always successfully.   
General Motors was the paradigm .  In the 1950s and 60s GM had been 
the proud  prototype of the  power and control that caused Galbraith to 
raise an alarm.. But by the mid 1980s General Motors was becoming the 
most public of object lessons in failure to meet product market 
competition.  It lost massive market share – going from about 43% of the 
U.S. domestic auto market to about 36% share over six or seven years. 
And this product market disaster generated, albeit not very promptly, a 
governance response.  Finally the G.M. board of directors  did what was 
almost unthinkable at the time:  it fired the CEO.  Today, in a time when 
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CEOs have a greatly reduced expected tenure, the shock  of the CEO of 
America’s paragon company being fired by “his board” may be hard to 
imagine.  Cars and electronics were of course only the first product 
markets in which global competition pushed U.S, firms into patterns of 
change, including ultimately changed relationship between the CEO, the 
directors and the company’s shareholders  
The second foundational change that contributed to the evolution of a new 
corporate governance model was an historic shift in the dominant political 
ideology of business regulation.  Students today may not fully appreciate 
just how regulated large parts of the American economy were in the 1950s 
and 60s. But over a relatively short period from say 1970 to 1990 the U.S. 
moved from a approach to business and economic regulation that placed 
heavy emphasis on government administration of price and entry and 
terms of service for a large part of the economy to a model that placed 
principle reliance upon market competition. This evolution too can be first 
noticed in the 1970s.   
Criticism of the post-war regulatory state originated in the 1960s as a left 
of center critique that claimed that the regulatory state had been captured 
by the regulated industries themselves and was used by them as a 
technique to dampen price competition.   These critics proposed a de-
regulatory solution as a way to encourage consumer-friendly price 
competition.  The earliest success of these critics was the U.S. Securities 
Acts Amendments of 1975.  That act de-regulated the fixed brokerage fees 
that had existed for 183 years on Wall Street. Almost at a stroke the 
brokerage business was transformed from one of fixed prices in which the 
most important feature of a broker was his social connection, into a 
business in which the most important feature of a broker was the speed 
and price of execution of a trade.  Everyone thought this was a big 
improvement, except of course the affable but dull witted sons of the well-
to-do who had found comfortable sinecures employment in the non-
competitive regime, thought this was a big improvement. This change was 
followed by the highly successful U.S. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 
That act   byr introducing ide-ranging deregulation of the airline industry. 
It thus made price competition and thus cheap flights available to the 
traveling public.  Both of these acts were judged notably  successful in 
lowering prices and won converts to the de-regulatory approach.  After  
the 1980  election of Ronald Reagan as the U.S. President , the political 
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right joined in with de-regulatory fervor. The Reagan administration lead a 
broad attack on regulation of business that, in the end, transformed the 
U.S. market economy.  Air, truck and rail transportation were deregulated;  
Oil and gas prices, electricity, telecommunications and of course banking 
and finance. Suddenly – or not so suddenly actually—markets were a 
whole lot freer and  lot more competitive.   
The zeitgeist must have been reading Milton Friedman, not J.K. Galbarith. 
The attraction of using  greater market competition as a technique of 
organizing economies seemed to be in the air. About the same time that 
President Reagan lead the assault on regulation in the US, Margaret 
Thatcher began her enormously beneficial privatization of the British 
economy; and most remarkably, only a bit later Deng Xiao Ping started 
moving the People’s Republic of China away from a pure planned and 
administered economy and towards greater market centered forms of 
economic activities. Later even the European social democratic and 
socialist parties were reluctantly introducing privatization programs in 
their domestic economies, albeit with a certain scorn for what then and 
now they refer to as the Anglo-Saxon model. 
In all events, this rise in less regulatory, more “market” centered political 
ideology was an important contributor to the increasingly competitive 
environment for U.S. businesses both domestically and globally and thus 
pressed powerfully on status quo management and governance techniques.   
The last fundamental force of change acting on corporate governance was 
the emergence of institutional investors.  As the great Chicago economist 
Frank Knight noted early in the 20th century, and as Professors Berle and 
Means later documented, the disaggregation of investors that was a natural 
consequence of the rise of large public equity markets, had had the effect 
of freeing managers of the supervising presence of “owners”.  In the 
absence of monitoring owners, management became free, to the extent 
product markets permitted, to be less efficient, particularly to build 
enterprises  that were uneconomically large.  The tendency for managers if 
left alone to act in ways that may benefit themselves rather than the 
residual owners of the firm is  of course what economists and we 
corporate law  academics too call the  agency problem of management and 
it is the focus of most corporate law scholarship,   
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But by the 1970s the environment that gave birth to the agency problem in 
corporate governance too began to change. The way in which the United 
States elected to provide pension benefits to workers – using these great 
business corporations as the channel for providing for private pension 
savings – stimulated the growth of great private pension funds and large 
institutional investors to manage these assets. Pension funds and mutual 
funds grew enormously especially in the post World War period.  By the 
late 1970s these institutions owned great chunks of securities in virtually 
all publicly traded firms.  For these huge investors –and the agents for 
them that evolved  such as Institutional Shareholders Services – collective 
action problems became  less a powerful  impediment to rational 
monitoring of corporate managers.  Moreover during the hostile takeover 
movement of the 1980s these investors  began to get used to the fat premia 
that were paid in takeovers.  When these premia disappeared with the 
recession of the hostile takeover movement in 1990, these investors began 
to turn their eyes  to the board of directors and corporate governance as a 
means to try to increase returns.  
It seems hardly an exaggeration to say that together change in these primal 
forces –the intensity of global product market competition, the application 
of scientific and technological discovery to new products and product 
improvements, the emergence of a market centered political ideology, and 
the growth and organization of institutional investors -- have driven 
change in corporate governance as in much else in our social life .  For 
corporate governance specifically I might mention one of the remarkable 
effects of this interaction of forces was the great growth in importance and 
scale of capital markets. The computer and all that it made possible, de-
regulation and innovative in banking and finance and growth in the global 
economy together changed the scope, richness  and scale of capital 
markets and the players in that market became larger and more 
specialized. 
These deep sources of change, have massively changed  corporate 
governance – for the better I think— but notice please that I have not yet 
mentioned law or liability rules in particular in talking about forces that 
have driven change in corporate governance.  I point this out because one 
of the points I wish to emphasize in this talk is the secondary nature of the 
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law of directors duties and liability rules especially in regulating corporate 
governance.  But changes in law did play a part in the evolution of modern 
corporate governance.   
Among the secondary effects of the changes in the product and capital 
markets was the massive hostile takeovers phenomenon in the U.S. in the 
1980s to which I just referred..  These leveraged transactions in turn 
created massive pressure on corporate law and governance.  In 1985 – in 
the famous Van Gorkom, Revlon and Unocal cases – the Delaware courts 
in  responding to these enormously significant transactions began a 
process of modification of their interpretation of corporate directors’ 
fiduciary duties.  The focus of these legal changes were two ideas. First, in 
these cases the Delaware Supreme Court made it very clear that it took 
very seriously the formal allocation of ultimate corporate power to the 
board of directors.  It did not adopt the  “realistic,” view of the academic 
community at that time which saw boards as inevitably passive.  In these 
change of corporate control cases, the Delaware Supreme Court demanded 
to see board engagement, not the CEO domination that Professor 
Galbraith had noted.   
The second thrust of these opinions was the willingness of the Delaware 
Supreme Court  to push the business judgment rule aside in order more 
actively to review board engagement in these cases. These judicial 
expressions of changing expectations of corporate directors were among 
the earliest changes in contemporary corporate governance standards. 
 
III. 
Now let us put this large scale historical framework aside and focus on 
corporation law itself. I wish to focus on advisory board model of 
corporate governance  and specifically on the legal obligation of directors, 
then and now, to exercise reasonable care and attention and on the 
business judgment rule.   
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During the period in which the  Advisory Board conception of governance 
dominated popular thinking, it is only a slight exaggeration to say that 
Delaware courts, and U.S. courts more generally, announced but did not 
enforce the duty of care.  Except for a few 19th century and depression era 
examples of bank directors who failed to detect a fraud that caused bank 
failure, there were essentially no cases that imposed liability on directors 
absent  self-dealing or suspected fraud.  If directors were charged in a 
shareholder suit with carelessness that proximately caused a corporate 
loss, absent a conflicting interest or some unusual circumstance, it would 
be expected that such suit would be dismissed on motion under the 
business judgment rule.  As you know, the business judgment rule is the 
doctrinal technique used by courts to protect directors from the risks they 
would face were juries permitted to answer the question: “did this director 
when he approved this loss making transaction act as a reasonable person 
in the same or similar circumstances would have acted?”   
Of course, everyday the  law requires judicial fact finders  to answer the 
question whether a driver of an automobile acted reasonably or not in 
particular circumstances.  Why then should the law evolve the business 
judgment rule to protect corporate directors from a similar review?  While 
alternative stories may be possible, I suggest that the rule used to prevent 
easy re-examination of compliance with the director’s duty of care 
represents not an effort not to help directors, but to help shareholders. To 
understand how it tends to do so we must look at the operation of this 
legal rule in its full context – that is as part of a system of rules and 
practices that are aimed at making it attractive for individual savers to 
invest capital in equity securities on capital markets.   Such investors 
willingly accept some estimated degree of risk in return in order to achieve 
some hoped-for return. The law tries to facilitate this acceptance of risk in 
several ways. First not only does it proscribe fraud but it also also by 
mandating full and fair disclosure of information relevant to the likely risk 
and returns of the  security.  But beyond the investment decision itself, in 
order for the equity investors actually to earn the return they hope for, the 
corporation must accept risky investment projects.   
It is however the nature of risky projects that some of them will fail.  And 
it is the nature of a some people who suffer a loss to wish to shift it to 
others.  The device to try to shift such losses, when the transaction is 
wholly at arms length, may be a shareholder law suit against directors 
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alleging breach of the fiduciary duty of care. L  Naturally, those  
approving risking investments know at the time that they make the 
decision that there will be an attempt to second-guess it, if the decision 
itself proves to be incorrect.  Two final facts complete the environment 
that makes the business judgment rule a rule that benefits equity investors.  
The first is the obvious fact that in any subsequent shareholder attack on 
the attentiveness of the board, the judicial system cannot perfectly 
distinguish after the fact  between business decisions that were negligent 
and those that were prudent but mistaken or unlucky.  The second fact is 
that given the scale of modern business corporations losses from 
investment decisions may be very large while directors individual 
proportion of gains from a wise decision will be comparatively small (the 
directors owning only a small percentage of the company’s stock in most 
public companies).   
Putting these facts together we see that while equity investors ex ante wish 
directors prudently to accept risk, given both the fallibility of the judicial 
system in distinguishing negligence from bad luck and the disproportion 
between directors upside and downside risks, absent protection from later 
liability, we might  expect directors to be disinclined to accept much risk 
in new projects.  In other words the prospects of ex post liability to 
shareholders for breach of the duty of care will ex ante defeat the 
shareholders desire for the acceptance of risky projects by the corporation. 
Thus strong protection against the risk of judicial second guessing 
reasonableness of board decisions – such as the business judgment rule -- 
is in the economic best interests of shareholders ex ante.  
Nor does a system that effectively denies to investors a right of action for 
breach of the duty of care does not leave investors unprotected.  The 
effective and low costs systematic protection against director inattention 
has little to do with the legal regulation of directors duties.    That 
protection resides in investors’  ability cheaply to diversify their risks of 
loss in the stock market.  That protection extends to risks of bad judgments 
that arise from all sources --- from director decisions that are ill-advised or 
even negligent to decisions that are prudent but risky and prove to be 
losers in the end perhaps because of macro-economic factors.  
So in providing directors with strong protection against liability for breach 
of the duty of care, the business judgment rule would appear to be 
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beneficial to investors.  But undeniably this strong protection appears to 
have a its dark side.  Public company directors, having neither substantial 
investment risk nor liability risk, might well tend to become passive.  
Indeed it is to try to assure director engagement or attentiveness that the 
law imposes a fiduciary duty of care in the first place.   Thus, the business 
judgment rule deals with one of the core problems of corporate  
governance:  how can we offer to directors protection from liability for 
claims of insufficient attention (and thus encourage them to authorize 
risky transaction), while still offering sufficient incentives to assure 
investors that directors act in an engaged, monitoring role.  
 Over the last twenty years we can observe in Delaware corporation law 
some tendency of courts to be willing to review the reasonableness of 
director decisions at least in some settings.  This first occurred in cases in 
the mid 1980s that I mentioned involving a change in corporate control 
and later a willingness to closely review the reasonableness of board 
processes and decisions was seen in the famous Disney case in which high 
executive compensation was challenged.  This tendency for courts to be 
willing to second guess board decisions or processes when there is no 
financial conflicting interest, which is sometimes encouraged by corporate 
governance commentators, is I think worrying and likely in the end not to 
be beneficial to investor interests. Once we take account of the deep 
changes in the environment of corporate governance that have evolved 
over the last 30 years , I would urge that we can see that investor interests 
have  more effective and lower costs techniques available to assure 
reasonable director attentiveness than the imposition of ex post liability for 
breach of a duty of care.  
Often when we lawyers think of controlling behavior we  think only or 
mainly in terms of liability rules.  This is a mistake.  There are other forces 
that shape or control director conduct that we need to recognize.  I 
mention three:  the moral beliefs of members of the groups from which 
directors are drawn and their concern for reputation among peers.  Second 
economic incentives and third shareholder voice.  
The most general of these supra-legal forces is, I suppose,  group based 
norms of appropriate behavior.  Whether one is a a corporate director, a 
member of a sports team or a school child at recess, well socialized 
persons hold developed  ideas of right conduct that at least absent financial 
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self-interest tend more or less powerfully to induce conduct consistent 
with those ideals.   Social control that operates through a commitment to a 
shared, belief system and its informal enforcement, is a very powerful if 
highly imperfect form of social control.  Given the unspecified nature of 
the core fiduciary duty of loyalty, one of the important roles of the 
Delaware Court of Chancery, for example, is through the use of its 
rhetoric to try to teach corporate directors what constitutes conduct 
consistent with duty in the that office. In doing so it exploits for a good 
purpose some directors’ natural tendency to prefer to do the right thing. 
Group moral codes – the ideology of board service -- are “enforced” 
through a variety of social techniques, but perhaps most salient for 
corporate directors is reputation among fellows and in with the public. 
Certainly the willingness of the business press to publicize directors who 
appear to have badly minimized their board engagement has had an effect 
on director attitudes. No one successful enough to be invited onto a public 
company board wants his or her photograph in Business Week or the 
Financial Times as the stooge that slept through board service while the 
enterprise was destroyed.  Admittedly this form of discipline is sometimes 
unfair.  Nevertheless it can be and indeed has been a powerful force for 
positive change in governance. 
There has been a marked change in the in dominant board ideology over 
the last twenty years.  Board ideology always appropriately emphasized 
collegiality but today the public ideology of board service also emphasizes 
independent monitoring of corporate performance and risk management.  
In part this may be a response to greater emphasis on the board 
independence, especially of the nomination or governance committee, 
mandated by the 2002 amendment of the NYSE listing standards.  But 
more deeply it reflects, I think, the combined effect of business 
journalism, active shareholder lobbying and judicial exhortation.  
A second non-liability force for shaping director conduct arises from the 
deployment of economic incentives established through property right or 
by contract. Incentives are not intended  to inhibit conduct, as a liability 
rule does, but to elicit it.  Incentives arrangements, such as director share 
ownership or stock based compensation, when well designed, have the 
advantage of being prospective in operation and capable of detailed 
customization. Thus for example at Berkshire Hathaway, Warren Buffett 
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only nominates for the board individuals with very substantial stock 
investments in the company.  These investments offer greater assurance of 
appropriate attentiveness than any liability rule is apt to provide.  
Moreover these incentives are self-enforcing.  
A third range of non-liability techniques for inducing heightened director 
attentiveness has come from efforts to make shareholder voting more 
effective. These efforts include organizational or coordination efforts by 
shareholder advocates and legal change. Several legal system changes, 
having nothing to do with liability rules have had the effect of inducing 
greater director attentiveness. I will mention three.  The first was the U.S. 
S.E.C.’s important 1992 amendment of its rules which  enabled 
institutional investors to communicate with each other respecting 
forthcoming corporate votes, without costly SEC filings.  The second rule 
change involved the 2002 change in NYSE listing standards that mandated 
that board nominations be in the hands of a wholly independent board 
committee.  And third and most significant is the current effort in the U.S. 
to enhance shareholder voting power by changing the director election 
standard from plurality of those voting to a majority of those voting. This 
change has been facilitated by an amendment to Delaware corporate law 
that makes enforceable director agreements calling for any director who is 
reelected by a plurality of votes, but not a majority of shares voting, to 
submit a resignation to the board. Lobbying action by institutional 
investors has caused increasing numbers of large corporations to put such 
arrangements in place.  Thus the power of active shareholders to influence 
board decisions wholly apart from liability rules has dramatically 
increased. 
 These efforts to enhance shareholder voice have had a notable effect.  No 
longer does one find directors or CEOs publicly defending the view – as 
they once thought right to do  -- that shareholders are just one of several 
corporate constituencies – all of which are to be treated fairly by senior 
management.  Now directors and senior officers as well, appear to believe 
that shareholder welfare is the metric of success, even if the board has 
discretion about how and over what period to do that. 
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IV.    
Let me try to relate these observations concerning the various non-liability 
forces acting on directors to the business judgment rule. I suggest that 
once we raise our gaze from the lawyer’s tool box of positive and negative 
incentives that can be judicially enforced, we will see a social environment 
that can assist us – and has been used by the Delaware courts – to help to 
move corporate boards to a more active engagement, but which can do so 
without creating the tension that the liability rule creates. 
Once you take notice of the myriad ways in which modern corporate 
governance constrains and incents corporate directors, and you 
acknowledge both the protections available to investors through 
diversification of their investments and their need to encourage risk taking 
activity, and finally once we recognize the deleterious effects on risk 
assumption that a liability rule creates, you may begin to believe, as I do 
believe, that the systematic risks to investors interests from possible 
director liability for breach of the duty of care, uncomplicated by financial 
conflict or improper motivation, likely far outweighs the systematic 
benefits that may accrue from deploying a liability rule, even if quite 
rarely.  Thus I suggest that that any erosion of the protections of the 
business judgment rule such as the Delaware courts have on occasion 
flirted over the last twenty years would be profoundly unwise for 
investors.   
Let me conclude this perhaps too widely ranging commentary, with some 
additional thoughts on modern corporate governance.  
We have changed much and are changing much in corporate governance.  
Power over the great institutions of our productive economy is in fact 
being reallocated.  Not only have product markets become more 
competitive, but within firms CEOs are to some extent losing power to 
boards. Even more strikingly corporate management and boards are losing 
power to shareholder representatives. Legal changes such as the failed 
movement to change shareholder access to the proxy and successful ones 
such as the ongoing effort to change the voting standard for corporate 
elections are part of this.  Equally significant are political efforts by 
institutional agents of ultimate owners of stock. These representatives of 
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investors are forcing the gradual reduction in staggered boards for 
example and the rescission of poison pill rights plans.  Perhaps even more 
importantly event-driven investors are growing in size and importance.  
The line between hedge funds, who invest in financial instruments and 
seek short term returns, and private equity funds, who seek to invest in 
control positions and seek longer horizon gains, is growing obscure.  
Eddie Lambert who moved from Goldman Sachs to his own hedge fund to 
now controlling both Sears and K Mart is perhaps a prototype.  The 
growth in market discipline that started to with air line deregulation in 
1978 and Mrs. Thatcher, continues to grow. 
But we academics, who in thinking about corporate governance focus 
exclusively on the agency problem of centralized management and ways 
to reduce it, must recall that the heroes of our account (the residual risk 
bearers) are imperfectly represented by those who announce themselves as 
the voice of shareholders. The human actors who pull the strings of the 
institutional investors and the governance entrepreneurs are agents too. 
We have not thought enough about how the actual incentives of those who 
act for these institutions may differ from the social interest in long-term 
wealth creation. We all know that ISS is a for profit business that has its 
own conflicts. We understand that hedge funds, who claim to be owners, 
may sometimes have hedged away the true economic risk of their position.  
We know that the average mutual fund has an annual turnover rate in its 
portfolio of more than 100% -- which seems consistent with excessive 
trading driven by an internal agency problem. But what do we corporate 
law academics make of these facts?  They do not fit well into the theory 
that structures the conventional academic view. 
One way to look at the current corporate governance scene is as reflecting 
a contest for the trust of the men and women of the country who have 
accumulated savings, often to fund their retirements.  On the one hand are 
agents of the real economy – decentralized senior management teams and 
boards who control the institutions of the real private economy. On the 
other hand are certain agents of financial economy – particularly hedge 
fund entrepreneurs, portfolio managers, investment banks and governance 
entrepreneurs.  So the question is who do you trust? 
I suppose it is obvious that sensible corporate governance public policy 
lies in some balance of power between the agents of the real economy and 
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agents of the financial economy.  There is no science to discover or to 
deduce that balance point.   But when matters of great importance to the 
welfare of the people are concerned and uncertainty is present I suggest 
modesty and caution in making changes to facilitate one group or the 
other.  At the very least I suggest that the agents of shareholders who have 
gathered a great deal of influence and power into their hands do not appear 
to require a liability lever against corporate boards, when those boards act 
without a conflicting interest. Thus at the very least I commend to courts 
and commentators a continuation of a strong business judgment rule. 
 
 
 
